<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Supply Chain - Tag - vo.rs</title><link>https://vo.rs/tags/supply-chain/</link><description>Supply Chain - Tag - vo.rs</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 07:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://vo.rs/tags/supply-chain/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>SBOM: Software Bill of Materials and Why You Should Care About Your Dependencies</title><link>https://vo.rs/story/sbom-software-bill-of-materials-and-why-you-should-care-about-your-dependencies/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;Every time a serious supply-chain vulnerability lands, the same scramble begins. Someone in a chat channel asks &amp;ldquo;are we affected?&amp;rdquo; and the honest answer, for most teams, is &amp;ldquo;give us a few days and we&amp;rsquo;ll tell you.&amp;rdquo; That few days is the gap an SBOM is meant to close. A Software Bill of Materials is just an inventory — a machine-readable list of every component that went into a build — but having one ready before the panic is the difference between an afternoon and a fortnight.&lt;/p&gt;</description><pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Sigstore and Cosign: Verifying Container Images Before They Run</title><link>https://vo.rs/story/sigstore-and-cosign-verifying-container-images-before-they-run/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;A container tag is a lie you&amp;rsquo;ve agreed to believe. &lt;code&gt;nginx:latest&lt;/code&gt; today and
&lt;code&gt;nginx:latest&lt;/code&gt; next week can be entirely different bytes, and a tag tells you
nothing about who built the image or whether it&amp;rsquo;s been swapped underneath you.
The whole modern supply-chain panic — compromised build pipelines, typosquatted
images, dependency confusion — comes down to that one weak link: we run images we
can&amp;rsquo;t actually verify. Sigstore, and its CLI &lt;code&gt;cosign&lt;/code&gt;, is the most practical fix
I&amp;rsquo;ve adopted, mostly because it finally killed the part of signing that everyone
hated: key management.&lt;/p&gt;</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Supply Chain Attacks: From npm Typosquatting to Poisoned Container Images</title><link>https://vo.rs/story/supply-chain-attacks-from-npm-typosquatting-to-poisoned-container-images/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;The most effective way to attack a company isn&amp;rsquo;t to break down its front door. It&amp;rsquo;s to be standing inside the delivery van that the company waves through the gate every morning. Supply chain attacks work because they exploit the one thing every developer does without thinking: pull in code and images they didn&amp;rsquo;t write, from people they&amp;rsquo;ve never met, and run them with full trust.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You did it this morning. &lt;code&gt;npm install&lt;/code&gt;. &lt;code&gt;docker pull&lt;/code&gt;. &lt;code&gt;pip install&lt;/code&gt;. Each one is an act of faith that the thing at the other end is what it claims to be and hasn&amp;rsquo;t been tampered with since you last looked. Mostly that faith is rewarded. The supply chain attacker&amp;rsquo;s entire business is the times it isn&amp;rsquo;t.&lt;/p&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate></item></channel></rss>