<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Sigstore - Tag - vo.rs</title><link>https://vo.rs/tags/sigstore/</link><description>Sigstore - Tag - vo.rs</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><copyright>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://vo.rs/tags/sigstore/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Sigstore and Cosign: Verifying Container Images Before They Run</title><link>https://vo.rs/story/sigstore-and-cosign-verifying-container-images-before-they-run/</link><description>&lt;p&gt;A container tag is a lie you&amp;rsquo;ve agreed to believe. &lt;code&gt;nginx:latest&lt;/code&gt; today and
&lt;code&gt;nginx:latest&lt;/code&gt; next week can be entirely different bytes, and a tag tells you
nothing about who built the image or whether it&amp;rsquo;s been swapped underneath you.
The whole modern supply-chain panic — compromised build pipelines, typosquatted
images, dependency confusion — comes down to that one weak link: we run images we
can&amp;rsquo;t actually verify. Sigstore, and its CLI &lt;code&gt;cosign&lt;/code&gt;, is the most practical fix
I&amp;rsquo;ve adopted, mostly because it finally killed the part of signing that everyone
hated: key management.&lt;/p&gt;</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate></item></channel></rss>